OPINION-By Kebour Ghenna
There are moments in economic policy when one wonders whether the prescription has become detached from the patient.
The International Monetary Fund’s Fifth Review under the Extended Credit Facility contains one such recommendation. It suggests that the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) should improve its gold market operations and “eventually exit the gold market.” The recommendation appears technically sound. Modern central banks, after all, are generally not expected to operate as commercial commodity traders. Their role is to maintain price stability, supervise the banking system, manage reserves and conduct monetary policy.
That logic may be perfectly appropriate for advanced economies with deep financial markets, abundant foreign exchange and diversified export sectors.
It is far less convincing for Ethiopia.
One cannot examine Ethiopia’s gold market as though it were Switzerland’s financial market or Canada’s mining industry. Ethiopia is not a mature industrial economy. It remains a foreign-exchange-constrained developing country whose economic transformation depends critically on securing every available dollar for productive investment, strategic imports and debt repayment.
Gold is therefore not simply another commodity.
It is one of Ethiopia’s most strategic national assets.
The IMF itself acknowledges that stronger gold exports have been instrumental in improving Ethiopia’s balance of payments and building international reserves. It also recognizes that lower gold prices would threaten reserve accumulation and increase external vulnerabilities. Yet, almost paradoxically, the recommendation is to reduce the role of the one institution capable of directly managing this strategic resource in the national interest.
That recommendation deserves far greater scrutiny than it has received.
This is not about gold. It is about who controls the national surplus.
The real issue is not whether the National Bank should buy gold.
The real issue is who should control one of Ethiopia’s largest sources of foreign exchange.
The IMF assumes that private commercial banks should progressively replace the National Bank as the principal buyers of gold. The underlying belief is that private markets allocate resources more efficiently, improve price discovery and reduce distortions.
That argument reflects a particular philosophy of economic organization.
But it ignores an equally important question.
Whose interests do private banks serve?
Commercial banks exist to maximize returns for their shareholders. They measure success through profitability, return on equity, and market share. That is entirely legitimate. It is precisely what private institutions are designed to do.
Central banks exist for an entirely different purpose.
They exist to safeguard the national currency, preserve financial stability, protect external reserves, and advance the country’s long-term economic interests.
These objectives are not identical. Indeed, they frequently diverge.
A private bank purchasing gold naturally asks: How much profit can be earned? What commission can be charged? How can foreign exchange be deployed most profitably?
The National Bank must ask different questions altogether.
How much foreign exchange does Ethiopia require for fuel imports? How much gold should be retained as strategic reserves? How can gold exports reduce external dependence? How can the formal gold market be strengthened while reducing smuggling?
These are questions of national development.
Markets do not answer them. States do.
Economic sovereignty is not an outdated concept
One curious feature of modern development advice is that countries are encouraged to surrender strategic control over precisely those sectors that determine their economic independence.
Gold is not simply an export commodity. It is internationally accepted money. It strengthens reserves. It improves external credibility. It provides insurance during periods of financial instability. It can be pledged as collateral. It finances essential imports. It strengthens the country’s negotiating position with external creditors.
In short, gold performs strategic functions far beyond its commercial value.
Countries across the world understand this perfectly.
Central banks continue accumulating gold reserves at record levels. They recognize that gold remains one of the few reserve assets carrying no counterparty risk.
Yet Ethiopia is encouraged to reduce the role of its own central bank precisely where strategic control matters most. One is entitled to ask why.
The liquidity argument is incomplete
The IMF’s principal concern is monetary.
When the National Bank purchases gold, it injects Birr into the economy. That expands reserve money.
If unmanaged, inflationary pressures may emerge. This concern is legitimate.
But it does not logically lead to the conclusion that the National Bank should abandon the gold market.It merely demonstrates that liquidity should be managed more effectively.
Central banks possess numerous instruments to sterilize excess liquidity.
Reserve requirements. Open market operations. Central bank bills. Term deposits. Foreign exchange sales.
Liquidity management is a technical challenge. It is not an argument for relinquishing strategic assets. Indeed, replacing the National Bank with commercial banks does not eliminate liquidity creation.
Commercial banks create deposits whenever they extend credit or purchase assets.
Liquidity would continue to enter the economy. The institutional channel changes. The macroeconomic question remains.
The appropriate response is therefore not withdrawal. It is better monetary management.
The IMF confuses institutional reform with institutional retreat
Every institution can be improved.
The National Bank’s gold operations should undoubtedly become more transparent. Pricing mechanisms can improve. Audit systems can strengthen. Assaying procedures can modernize. Operational risks can be reduced. Commercial functions can be organizationally separated from monetary operations.
None of these reforms require the National Bank to abandon its strategic role.
There is an important difference between reforming an institution and removing it from the market altogether.
Unfortunately, the report appears to move too quickly from identifying operational weaknesses to recommending institutional withdrawal. That is not sound development policy.
Weak institutions should be strengthened, not dismantled.
The premium paid for gold is not necessarily a distortion
The report also criticizes the premium paid above international gold prices.
From a textbook perspective, this appears inefficient. But textbooks do not purchase gold in Ethiopia.
The National Bank is not competing against a perfectly functioning competitive market. It competes against smuggling networks. Informal traders. Cross-border buyers. Illegal export channels.
The premium is therefore not simply an economic cost. It is also the price of formalization. If eliminating the premium causes more gold to leave Ethiopia illegally, the country loses: foreign exchange, tax revenue, statistical visibility, reserve accumulation, and regulatory oversight.
The relevant comparison is therefore not between paying a premium and paying no premium. The comparison is between paying a modest premium and losing the gold altogether.
Development policy often requires this type of pragmatic intervention precisely. Markets sometimes require correction because markets themselves fail.
Development requires strategic institutions
Perhaps the greatest weakness in the IMF recommendation is that it views the National Bank exclusively through the lens of orthodox central banking.
But developing economies require institutions capable of doing more than maintaining monetary stability. They require institutions that actively support structural transformation.
Countries that successfully industrialized rarely confined their public institutions to narrow technical mandates. Their central banks frequently supported export finance. Industrial credit. Strategic sectors. Domestic capital formation.
Reserve management was integrated with broader development strategy. Economic transformation has never been achieved simply by stabilizing inflation. It requires institutions capable of directing scarce national resources toward productive investment.
Gold is one such resource.
Whose development model is being promoted?
This inevitably raises a larger question. Why is there such confidence that private commercial banks will better serve Ethiopia’s long-term interests?
Private banks may indeed purchase gold efficiently. They may generate profits. They may improve transaction speed. But efficiency for shareholders is not synonymous with development for the nation.
The objective of development policy is not to maximize bank profitability. It is to maximize national welfare. Those are fundamentally different objectives.
A commercial bank is under no obligation to consider Ethiopia’s industrial strategy, external vulnerability or long-term reserve position.
The National Bank is.
One therefore struggles to understand why the IMF appears willing to weaken the very institution whose mandate extends beyond private commercial considerations.
The recommendation seems to assume that market incentives automatically produce national outcomes. History suggests otherwise. Markets allocate resources according to profitability.
Development requires allocating resources according to national priorities. Those priorities often coincide. But not always.
When they diverge, governments exist precisely to protect the national interest.
Ethiopia should strengthen, not surrender, its strategic role
None of this implies that the National Bank should retain an opaque monopoly. Far from it.
Gold purchases should become more transparent. Pricing should be formula-based. Independent auditing should be mandatory. Commercial banks should participate competitively under a clear regulatory framework. Modern payment systems should replace administrative discretion. Liquidity injections should be sterilized through active monetary operations.
But the National Bank should remain the strategic buyer of last resort. It should continue accumulating reserves. It should continue shaping the formal gold market. It should continue ensuring that one of Ethiopia’s most valuable strategic resources serves national development rather than purely commercial interests.
The objective should not be to eliminate state participation. It should be to make state participation more effective.
A disappointing recommendation
The IMF has rightly emphasized macroeconomic stability, stronger reserves and sustainable public finances. These are important objectives. But the recommendation that Ethiopia’s central bank should progressively withdraw from the gold market represents a disappointing misunderstanding of development economics.
It treats Ethiopia as though it already possessed the institutional depth, foreign exchange abundance and financial sophistication of mature market economies.
It does not.
Ethiopia remains a country where foreign exchange is scarce, industrial transformation incomplete and economic sovereignty still under construction. In such circumstances, abandoning strategic control over one of the country’s most important reserve-generating assets would not represent modernization.
It would represent retreat.
Development has never been achieved by reducing the state’s capacity to manage strategic national resources before strong domestic institutions and markets are capable of assuming that responsibility in the public interest.
The National Bank of Ethiopia should certainly modernize its gold operations. It should become more transparent. More accountable. More efficient. But it should not abandon a function that lies at the intersection of monetary stability, reserve accumulation, external sovereignty, and national development.
For Ethiopia today, the question is not whether the National Bank behaves like the central banks of advanced economies. The question is whether Ethiopia can afford to surrender strategic control over one of the few assets capable of financing its own transformation.
The answer, from the standpoint of development economics, is no, no, and no!!
Editor’s Note: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of Ethiopia Today.