OPINION
By: Kebour Ghenna
Ethiopia Today, May 17, 2026
Ethiopia is trying to solve a production problem with financial engineering.
That, in a sentence, is the dilemma.
The country liberalizes the birr, cuts subsidies, tightens policy, and hopes that markets, once finally allowed to breathe, will guide capital toward exports, manufacturing, and productivity. This is the broad logic behind the IMF program. Correct the distortions and remove the controls, and the economy will reorganize itself into something more dynamic and sustainable.
Elegant theory.
Unfortunately, economies are not laboratory experiments. They are living systems held together by confidence, incentives, and institutions, three things Ethiopia currently lacks in sufficient quantity.
The official narrative points to progress. Foreign-exchange inflows have improved. Gold and coffee exports are helping. Inflation, while painful, is expected to be kept under the lid. The parallel market premium has narrowed. Stability, we are told, is gradually returning.
Perhaps.
But there is an uncomfortable detail buried beneath the optimism: Ethiopia’s recent forex improvement owes much to rising commodity prices, particularly gold and coffee, factors largely outside the government’s control. Commodity windfalls have a way of masquerading as policy success. Governments often mistake favorable prices for structural transformation. The distinction only becomes visible when prices fall.
And prices eventually fall.
This is where the comparison with China becomes revealing.
China did not simply devalue its currency and wait for exports to bloom. It managed its exchange rate as part of a broader industrial strategy backed by institutional discipline, infrastructure expansion, production capacity, and relentless manufacturing growth.
Investors tolerated distortions because they trusted the larger direction of the economy.
Factories were being built. Ports expanded. Electricity arrived. Supply chains deepened. The state, whatever its flaws, projected continuity.
China bent market prices because markets believed China was building something underneath them.
Ethiopia’s situation is different.
The country is attempting currency liberalization while simultaneously fighting insurgencies, facing infrastructure bottlenecks, struggling with forex shortages, and relying heavily on imported industrial inputs. Investors may tolerate inflation. They may tolerate bureaucracy. They may even tolerate corruption. But they struggle to tolerate uncertainty about whether roads remain open, electricity stays reliable, or conflict spreads into the next industrial corridor.
Manufacturing requires more than a cheaper currency. It requires predictability.
This is where the IMF logic begins to thin out.
A weaker currency can help exports eventually – but only if a country already possesses enough productive capacity to respond. Otherwise, devaluation simply makes imports more expensive while exposing the economy’s structural weakness. In countries heavily dependent on imported fuel, machinery, medicine, fertilizer, and industrial inputs, the immediate effect is not export dynamism but cost escalation.
And so the state finds itself trapped between two unpleasant choices.
Control the currency too tightly, and shortages deepen, black markets expand, and investment suffocates.
Liberalize too quickly, and inflation surges, production costs rise, and social frustration intensifies.
Neither path, by itself, solves the deeper issue: Ethiopia produces too little of what the world demands and imports too much of what it needs to function.
That is not primarily a monetary problem. It is a production problem.
Which brings us to the uncomfortable question policymakers rarely ask openly: What exactly is the development model?
If the answer is merely “stabilize and liberalize,” then the country risks becoming trapped in permanent adjustment, stabilizing one imbalance only to encounter another. Fiscal tightening may reduce inflation. Currency liberalization may narrow forex distortions. But neither automatically creates industrial depth.
Factories do not emerge because spreadsheets improve.
The deeper challenge is institutional credibility.
China’s system worked, not because markets were perfectly free, but because investors believed the state could maintain long-term direction. Ethiopia’s reforms, by contrast, often appear defensive rather than developmental: policies designed to manage scarcity rather than accelerate production.
And markets understand the difference.
This does not mean all the reforms are wrong. Many are necessary. Artificial exchange rates, endless subsidies, and monetary expansion eventually destroy economies. But stabilization is not transformation. It merely creates the possibility of transformation.
What Ethiopia requires now is not merely macroeconomic correction, but strategic clarity:
secure transport corridors,
reliable energy,
export-oriented industrial concentration,
credible legal predictability,
and above all, political stabilization.
Without these, the economy risks becoming a permanently adjusted economy, always reforming, never transforming.
In the end, the real currency crisis is not the birr itself.
It is the shortage of confidence in the productive future of the economy behind it.