OPINION
By: Kebour Ghenna
The fighting spreading across Ethiopia raises a question no one wants to ask aloud: could this country end as Yugoslavia did, torn apart by a struggle its leaders swore would hold it together?
No one can answer that with certainty. Ethiopia has its own history, its own institutions, its own bonds. Yugoslavia is a warning, not a prophecy. Its collapse accelerated when leaders competing for power taught people to see neighbours as threats and made control of territory the only measure of political survival. War then hardened divisions that politics might once have managed.
Seven organizations from different regions have announced an alliance against PM Abiy Ahmed’s government. Some fought on opposite sides of the Tigray war. Some still disagree about territory and political questions. The government commands the state and its armed forces. The alliance has declared a common enemy, but it has not yet shown that its members share a common idea of the country they would govern.
Today both sides are on the battlefield. It is too early to write as though a peace conference were about to begin. The immediate danger is that each side believes more fighting will improve its position, while the country grows less able to bear the cost.
The war is often described as a clash of ethnic groups or competing ideologies. Those descriptions miss much of what is at stake. This is also a struggle over “who controls the state”: its army, land, revenue, appointments, and the power to decide where resources go. Leaders speak in the name of peoples and regions, yet the rewards and decisions remain concentrated among a small number of political and military elites. Ordinary citizens are asked to prove their loyalty by accepting the losses. The arithmetic is simple: many are asked to pay, few get to decide.
This pattern has deep roots. Emperor Tewodros II sought to end the rule of competing regional princes and build an effective central government. He had a vision of a stronger Ethiopia. He also tried to impose central authority by force, and conquered areas continued to resist him. His story belongs to its nineteenth-century setting. It also poses a question for leaders today: how long can a government mistake the ability to take territory for the ability to govern its people?
The time of emperors has passed. So has the belief that Ethiopia’s diverse communities can be made to accept one political settlement because an army has carried it to their door. Modern weapons can destroy a position quickly. They cannot make a frightened population trust those who claim to rule it. Nor can regional leaders assume that taking up arms gives them a mandate to speak for everyone who shares their identity.
The danger of the imperial habit lies here: whoever reaches the center begins to imagine that the whole country can be directed from it. Those kept outside begin to see possession of the center as the only route to safety. Power changes hands; the struggle over the throne survives. Ethiopia has changed its constitutions and the names of its ruling parties, but it has not escaped this contest over who commands the state. A throne by another name is still a throne.
Foreign powers make that contest more dangerous. The UAE has publicly declared support for the federal government. Ethiopia says that Eritrea supports the new alliance; other governments have interests in the Horn’s ports, trade routes, and security. Their involvement must be judged on evidence, without assuming that every claim of sponsorship is true. But the larger risk is clear: a war sustained by outside resources can continue long after the people living through it have exhausted their own. When the money comes from elsewhere, the dying is still local.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s economic problems do not wait for a victor. Families face expensive food, scarce work, and the costs of interrupted trade. Farmers cannot plant with confidence where fighting may return. Businesses hesitate to invest where a road may close. Public money and skilled people are drawn toward war. Growth may still appear in national accounts, but a country cannot build broad prosperity while treating its own citizens’ insecurity as a secondary concern. A nation at war is a nation borrowing against its children.
This is why the Yugoslav comparison matters. The worst outcome would not begin with a formal announcement that Ethiopia has broken apart. It could begin with something slower: regions becoming harder to reach, neighbours trusting one another less, armed leaders gaining authority over civilian life, and the idea of a shared future losing its hold. A country can remain on a map while the ties that make it a country are being worn away. Maps are patient; nations are not.
Ethiopia is not condemned to that outcome. Its people have ties of family, faith, commerce, and common life that do not disappear because political leaders draw harder lines between them. But those ties cannot carry an endless war unaided. They need leaders willing to recognize that no faction can secure Ethiopia by claiming to own it.
For now, the battlefield is deciding too much. The questions citizens should keep asking are harder than “Who is winning?” Who will still have a home when the fighting moves on? Who will be able to work, farm, and send children to school? And when a leader promises to save Ethiopia, which Ethiopians are being asked to pay for that promise?
An empire could try to unite by command. A modern Ethiopia must find a way for its people to belong without being conquered into agreement. That truth may be unwelcome to every side now fighting. Ignoring it is how the fear of a Yugoslav ending becomes more than a comparison.
The choice is not between unity and division. It is between a unity built on consent and a unity imposed by force, and history has already shown which one lasts.
Editor’s Note: The opinion expressed in this article is that of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of Ethiopia Today.