OPINION
By: Kebour Ghenna
Ethiopia Today, May 2026:
Ethiopia heads toward its national election in less than two weeks with the outcome already known.
The Prosperity Party will win.
The real suspense lies elsewhere, not in who governs, but in how many parliamentary seats the ruling party graciously allows its “competitors” to collect along the way.
Competitors.
Not opposition.
The distinction matters.
Opposition parties oppose. They challenge the ruling order. They seek power. They present themselves as an alternative government.
Competitors, by contrast, merely compete within boundaries already understood in advance. They do not threaten the center of gravity. They orbit around it.
And so Ethiopian politics has evolved into something rather modern: a system where many smaller parties no longer wish to be seen as opponents of power but as participants near power.
Opposition sounds confrontational. Competitor sounds civilized, cooperative… employable.
This is important because the real political rush in Ethiopia today is not toward State House.
It is toward ministerial office.
A seat at the table matters more than overturning the table.
And the Prosperity Party, in its expansive and magnanimous spirit, understands this perfectly well. In some constituencies, it will not even bother fielding candidates, allowing carefully selected competitors to secure parliamentary seats and preserve the healthy appearance of pluralism.
After all, every dominant system requires decorative variation.
No empire enjoys dining alone.
The irony, of course, is that many of these competitors differ from the Prosperity Party less in substance than in shade. Most are, in one form or another, “light Prosperity.” Slightly softer rhetoric. Slightly different regional posture. Slightly less authority.
But fundamentally, they operate within the same broad political and economic framework.
Which naturally raises the uncomfortable question:
Why choose the imitation when the original remains fully available?
That, more than campaign speeches, explains the mood of the election.
Go back several election cycles, and Ethiopia still possessed recognizable opposition politics. Fragmented, imperfect, often chaotic, but opposition nonetheless. Parties argued openly about power, ideology, state structure, economic direction, and national identity.
This election feels different.
The atmosphere is less confrontational than accommodating.
Less revolution than negotiation.
The ruling party no longer merely dominates politics. It defines the political climate within which politics itself operates.
To deny the impact of the Prosperity era would be dishonest.
The Prime Minister and his party reshaped Ethiopia politically, economically, and socially in ways few leaders manage within such a short period.
Politically, power became more centralized under a single national structure rather than the old coalition model. Economically, the country moved toward partial liberalization—telecom reform, banking reform, currency adjustment, subsidy reductions, and IMF-backed restructuring. Socially, Ethiopia became simultaneously more modern and more fractured: more digitized, more urbanized, more connected – and also more polarized, less secure, and economically uneven.
And hanging over all of this, quietly but unmistakably, is the reality of conflict.
One cannot seriously discuss Ethiopia’s future while pretending the insurgencies across various parts of the country are merely temporary disturbances. Wars leave scars that survive long after ceasefires. Roads can be rebuilt faster than trust. Buildings recover faster than institutions. Economies recover faster than societies.
Even if peace gradually returns, the damage does not simply evaporate.
Years of insecurity altered investment decisions, weakened local economies, disrupted agriculture, displaced communities, interrupted education, and deepened mistrust between citizens and the state. Entire regions learned to live with uncertainty as part of daily economic life.
Factories require stability.
Tourism requires security.
Farmers require functioning markets.
Investors require predictability.
No serious industrial transformation occurs while conflict becomes normalized.
This may ultimately become the defining contradiction of the Prosperity era: a government attempting simultaneously to modernize the economy while parts of the country remain trapped in recurring insecurity.
The long-term consequences remain unknown.
Perhaps the reforms will eventually create a stronger productive economy. Perhaps they will merely create a more unequal one.
Perhaps stabilization will eventually restore confidence. Or perhaps the cumulative effects of conflict, inflation, and imbalance will linger far longer than policymakers currently assume.
History has not yet rendered its verdict.
But ordinary voters do not think in historical horizons.
They ask simpler questions.
“Am I better off today than I was five years ago?”
For a narrow segment of urban Ethiopia—those connected to formal business, property, finance, construction, telecommunications, and government-linked opportunity—the answer will be yes. Addis Ababa increasingly resembles a city sprinting toward the future, glass tower by glass tower.
But outside that world, the answer becomes less certain.
Food costs rose.
Housing costs rose.
Transport costs rose.
Purchasing power weakened.
Conflict spread.
And millions found themselves working harder merely to maintain yesterday’s position.
This is the contradiction quietly hovering over the election.
The country changed enormously.
Yet many citizens remain unconvinced that their own lives have changed proportionately.
Still, none of this threatens the immediate electoral outcome.
The competitors will compete.
The Prosperity Party will govern.
Some competitors will become ministers.
Others will become advisors.
And everyone, more or less, will continue competing within the broad political architecture already established by the mother party.
Which may be precisely the point.
Because the real challenge facing Ethiopia today is no longer opposition.
It is expectation.
Editor’s Note: The opinion expressed in this commentary is the author’s own and does not represent the views of Ethiopia Today