OPINION
By: Kebour Ghenna
The authorities have a plan.
There are, at last count, some 30 local banks in Ethiopia. Too many, it is said. Too small. Too weak. The solution is simple enough: raise the capital bar and let the rest sort themselves out. Those who cannot keep up must merge, be bought, or quietly disappear.
Stronger banks. Safer system. Problem solved.
It has a certain appeal. Like most tidy ideas, it fits neatly on paper.
But the real world has a way of resisting tidy solutions.
Begin with the obvious detail that is easy to overlook: one bank already towers over the rest. The Commercial Bank of Ethiopia holds roughly half the market. Not a large bank among many, but a giant among dwarfs.
Now consider what happens when the dwarfs are told to merge.
Do you get a balanced system? Or do you simply end up with a slightly smaller number of slightly larger dwarfs… still orbiting the same giant?
The weight does not disappear. It shifts. And often, it concentrates.
The popular story is that bigger banks are safer banks. More capital. More scale. More resilience. Perhaps. But size has a habit of disguising weakness as strength. Two weak banks joined together do not necessarily produce a strong one. More often, they produce a larger institution with the same frailties, only now harder to ignore when trouble arrives.
Finance has seen this movie before.
The real issue, then, is not that Ethiopia has too many banks. It is that it has too much banking in one place and too little everywhere else.
Which brings us, curiously enough, to China.
China, too, had weak banks. Many of them. It did not hesitate to merge some, close others, and clean up balance sheets. But that was not the heart of its strategy.
The more interesting move was elsewhere.
China strengthened its largest banks, recapitalized them, stripped out bad loans, and imposed tighter discipline. It separated policy lending from commercial banking. And then, rather than sweeping away the smaller institutions, it allowed different types of banks to emerge, regional banks, city banks, specialized lenders, each serving a particular function.
It did not aim for uniformity. It built layers.
Some banks were large. Some were small. Some were local. Some were national. But each had a role to play.
Ethiopia’s approach risks missing this distinction.
If every bank is forced into the same mold, same capital threshold, same ambition, same structure, then what emerges is not a diversified system, but a narrower one. Fewer players. Similar balance sheets. Similar risks.
And all of them, still, in the shadow of the dominant bank.
This is where the neat logic of consolidation begins to fray.
Yes, weak banks should be dealt with. That is not in question. A bank that cannot stand on its own capital is not a bank, it is a promise waiting to be broken.
But consolidation is a tool, not a strategy.
Used carefully, it can strengthen the system. Used broadly, it can produce something else entirely: a system that looks cleaner, larger, and more orderly… but is, in fact, more concentrated and no less fragile.
And concentration, in finance, is a curious thing. It feels safe, until it isn’t.
If half the system rests on one institution, then stability is not a property of the system. It is a bet on that institution.
Better, perhaps, to think less about how many banks there are, and more about what they actually do.
A banking system is not improved simply by making its components larger. It is improved by making them useful, distinct, and appropriately scaled to their purpose.
Some banks should be large. Some should be small. Some should serve local enterprise. Others should handle national flows of capital. Diversity is not a weakness. It is often the only real defense against uniform failure.
So yes, raise the standards. Clean up the weak. Encourage mergers where they make sense.
But do not confuse fewer banks with better banking.
Because in the end, removing pieces from the board does not always make the game safer.
Sometimes, it just makes the remaining pieces more important.