BY ATRSAW NECHO AND YARED DEBEBE (FEBRUARY 2024)
Rift Vally Institute
The Fano insurgency in the Amhara region is currently one of the most serious security threats affecting Ethiopia. As well as causing widespread deadly violence—largely between the Fano, federal security and local government forces—affecting the region’s civilian population, the insurgency has severely disrupted the economy of the Amhara region and beyond.
While the Fano have retained a decentralized and loosely coordinated command structure, their widespread support from within the region, and the Amhara diaspora, suggests they are likely to have an enduring influence on the political and security environment in the region for some time to come. The federal government’s recent decision to extend the state of emergency in the region for another four months, governing through a military command post and the Ethiopian National Defense Forces (ENDF), suggests that the government will continue its military operations with or without negotiations with the Fano.
The Fano groups’ lack of cohesive leadership has made this more difficult, but the current low-level insurgency, with no sign of an end, is not sustainable, and will likely require more creative political solutions to resolve.
ORIGINS OF THE FANO
In contemporary Ethiopia, Fano are understood to be armed groups from the Amhara region that see themselves as defending the interests of the region’s population. However, the origin of the term goes back centuries, and in Amharic, it refers to ‘someone who travels of their own volition’ or a ‘band of leaderless soldiers who were not accountable to anybody.’ In pre-twentieth century Ethiopia, Fano were an important source of armed labour for regional rulers, for whom they could be mobilized and fight at times of need. During the twentieth century, Fano were also mobilized under the more centralized administration of Haile Selassie to repulse the Italian invasion and occupation from 1936–41. Later, in the 1960s, the Marxist-Leninist Ethiopia Student Movement used the term ‘Fano’ to describe its members in their struggle against the Haile Selassie and Derg regimes. More recently, in 2016, youth led protests in the Amhara region coined themselves as ‘Fano’, although the (mostly) peaceful nature of the demonstrations marked a break with the previously armed character of the groups. In combination with the Oromo Qerroo protest movement, the Fano challenged the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), significantly contributing to the accession of Abiy Ahmed and the Prosperity Party (PP) to power in 2018. In the years that followed, however, the interests and demands of the Fano movement were perceived by some of its members as having been ignored by the new political establishment. This resulted in a continuation of youth-led protests in the Amhara region, including the #beqa (#Stop) demonstration in 2021, which condemned identity-based attacks against the Amhara, particularly those living outside their home region.
Increasingly, signs of Fano militancy and involvement in armed conflicts started to appear, particularly those associated with causes seen as being important to Amhara nationalist interests. For example, Fano were mobilized and involved in sporadic clashes with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) over the disputed Al-Fashaga region from 2020 to 2023. They also played prominent roles in areas where Amhara populations are often perceived as being under threat—often outside of the Amhara region, such as in the border areas between Benishangul-Gumuz and Amhara regions (particularly in the Metekel Zone); in the area around Ataye, in the Oromo Special Zone; and on the border with North Shewa. The outbreak of war between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in November 2020 saw the involvement of Fano on the government—federal and regional— side. They played a particularly significant role in advancing the claims of the Amhara region over the contested areas of Wolqayt-T(s)egede), T(s)elmet, and Raya, as well as countering Tigrayan advances into the region, particularly in 2021.
The war provided an opportunity for the Fano to build camps, recruit and train fighters, and utilize the logistics, security, and administrative networks of the government. This in turn enabled them to widen their societal networks, attract new members, and strengthen their military capacity…..
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